Civil service leadership selection in China: Historical evolution and current st

Civil service leadership selection in China: Historical evolution and current status
Gu, X. D.,  Higgins, L.T.,  Weng, L.X.,  Holt, X. Y.
Gu,  Xiangdong,  Beijing G＆G (双 高) Talent  Development Center, Beijing  First Resource Research Institute ,  P.R.C.
 Louise T. Higgins., The University of Chester, Chester, UK.
Structured Abstract:

Purpose:	The aim of this paper is to examine the evolution and development of the selection process and methods used by the Chinese government for appointing public officials.
Design/methodology/approach:	We adopted an approach combining literature and document reviews with discussion with field experts.
Findings:	China has a long history of selecting the most able individuals for government officials.  During the political turmoil of the 20thcentury, this was abandoned for ideological reasons.  Current selection criteria and process are increasingly based on solid psychology and management approaches.
Research and practical implications	This paper is an overview of developments. It may serve as a baseline for future research and practice on exploring sound and institutionalized selection methods and processes.
Originality /Value:	This is an initial attempt to explore senior Chinese officials’ selection process.

Category of Paper: General Review
Keywords:  selection process, government official appointment, Chinese Communist Party. Central Organization Department (COD)
Introduction
It has long been a tradition in Chinese history that the government selects qualified and talented candidates for public officers through examination systems. As the earliest occupational test in the world, a selection system was established in the Tang dynasty and evolved into a sophisticated three stage national Imperial Civil Service written examination in the Ming dynasty (Elman, 1991; Teng, 1943; Zhang, 1988). This process remained for hundreds of years until the end of the Qing dynasty in the beginning of the 20^th century. During the turmoil of revolutions throughout the 20^th century, especially after 1949, governmental posts were determined centrally and the related promotion was granted according to seniority and Communist Party revolutionary credentials (Wu, 2002b ) . Since its rapid opening up after 1978 and the subsequent economic expansion, it has become increasingly critical for China to modernize the way it selects officials and managers (Aufrecht and Bun, 1995; Chan and Li, 2007; Chou; 2004, 2008). This trend is represented by recent development and practice of psychological testing and related selection approaches. In this paper, we review and examine these developments.
Purpose and Significance
We aim to review and examine the evolution and development of the selection process and approaches used by the Chinese government for appointing public officials.  It intends to contribute to the literature of Chinese human resource management (HRM) focusing on the civil service sector (gong wu yuan, 公务员). Understanding the approach to governmental official’s candidate assessment is important not only because limited literature is available in the West, but also because public recruitment of civil officials has beenincreasingly valued by central and local governments as an important aspect of reform in the personnel selection system. It has been considered a way of enhancing the party’s governance capability (Central Organization Department Test and Assessment Centre, CODTAC, 2010).  It is also noted that effective selection methods may eventually reduce some of the charges of corruption that the government brings against local officials selected under the previous system of political patronage and reduces potentials for nepotism and corruptions （Japan Economic News, 2010).
We adopted a historical and literature review method for this paper. Literature searches were carried out using academic journals and official and non-official reports in the National Library of China. The following key words were used independently or different combinations, “development of examination and assessment”, “selection of officials” and “policies of public recruitment.” We also reviewed Chinese historical literature through internet sites such as baidu.com.
Historical Evolution
Selecting qualified individuals for public administrative positions in governments has always played a key role in the development and management of any nation.  In ancient China, prior to a system known as xuan xian ren neng (选贤任能, select the virtuous and employ the able) (He, 1999), in the Zhou dynasty (1046—221BC), the government practised a system of shi qing shi lu (世卿世禄制). It was a hereditary system where not only one’s official post, but also one’s salary was passed on to the family (Guo, 1979). Later, the rulers in the Han dynasty carried out a cha ju zheng pi system (察举征辟制). This system consisted of two components: one was a bottom-up approach to that after passing an examination, candidates would be recommended by local officials to the emperor for official positions; the other was a top-down approach in that the emperor could issue imperial edicts to employ individuals without examination (Wei, 1989). The emperors at the time believed that employing sufficient men of virtue and talents would create a powerful nation (Wang, 2005a).   Prior to establishing the ke ju system, from the Wei and Jin (魏晋) dynasties to the Sui and Tang (隋唐) dynasties, central government officials were classified into a nine-grade merit system known as jiu pin zhong zheng (九品中正制). This system lasted for about four hundred years (Guo, 1979). Li Shi Min (李世民), the second emperor of the Tang Dynasty noted that the way to keep good public order was to employ competent men of talent with fairness.  He believed that local officials were close to the grassroots people, therefore, they had to be strictly checked and carefully chosen (Guang, 2009).
The well known ke ju (科举) imperial civil service examination system evolved over time.  In about 1100 BC, candidates were tested in music, archery, riding, writing, arithmetic and ceremonial rites. In the Han Dynasty (206BC - 220AD) there were test batteries of written examinations in civil and military law, agriculture, taxation and geography (Zhang, 1988). By the 7^th century, it had become a national system in testing candidates’ ability to memorize Confucian classics, write essays, compose poetry, complete classical sentences, etc. (Zhang, 1988).  In the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) there was a well developed multi-stage programme with local and regional testing centres. Those receiving the highest marks went on to provincial capital for further testing and advanced to the national capital for more tests (Higgins & Zheng, 2002). During the 19^th century, Westerners learned about this system. In 1832, the British East India Company started to copy it as a way to selecting its officers (Teng, 1943). The system was eventually adopted by the British Government and other Western countries (Kaplan & Saccuzzo, 1993).
In short, throughout most of China’s civilized history, there has always been a strong desire by the government to select qualified and talented individuals for managing the country.  This tradition has been maintained over time with different criteria since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.  
Contemporary Evolution
       In general, selecting and appointing government officials in contemporary China under the Communist Party’s leadership can be divided into three stages: (1) pre-Cultural Revolution stage from 1949 to 1966; (2) post-Mao stage from 1978 to 1992; and (3) post economic reform stage from 1993 to the present. It must be noted that we have deliberately avoided discussing the 10-year period of the Cultural Revolution and consider it a separate research topic.
Stage One: A Soviet Union Tradition  
 While the Western psychology was introduced to China in the earlier 20th Century, (Kodama, 1991), the Communist Party and the government fell out of favour of it but adopted the Soviet Union approach to psychology after 1949 (Barabanshchikova & Voltsova, 1989). Western psychology with its emphasis on individual differences was considered a bourgeois pseudo-science contradicted to the Marxism that people were primarily shaped by their social class (Kuo, 1971), “because human behavior is always carried out in a complex social context, with current and historical causes, how could the results of experimental psychology ever explain the cause of human conflict” (Higgins & Zheng, 2002) Psychology departments in Chinese universities were closed down and any kind of psychological testing of individual differences was seen as anathema and was prohibited. 
Following the Soviet Union’s tradition, the Central Government established a highly centralized appointment system for senior civil officials (Wu, 2002b). Under this system, all cadres in the central and local governments were selected by the Party Committees. A practice under this system was that cadres were in charge of those who were two ranks below, thus strengthening the authority of senior officials (Liang and Wei, 2010b).  It ensured that the Central Government not only controlled appointments at provincial and ministerial level, but also for all cities and counties. This highly centralized system has enabled the Party’s total control of the nation for challenges at home and abroad and maintained its absolute political power (Liang and Wei, 2010b).
However, this system could not last as it had unavoidable weaknesses. First, it had no competitive mechanism to allocate human resources effectively because there was no testing and assessment of cadre’s competencies in a fair and objective way. Nor did it have a follow-up appraisal process. Second, it lacked of institutional assurance of openness and excluded individual choice.  Third, the public were skeptical about this system with its long standing elements such as promotion by seniority or favoritism, as well as the sharing of privileges among cadres (Wang,2005a). As the Communist Party increased its power, the possibility for corruptions was embedded in the system.  
The centralized appointment system has also been extended to the national higher education system due to lack of educated talents. In 1949, of the 540 million population, there were only 21,000 university graduates (China Statistics Yearbook, 2000. To develop the country’s economic priorities,  the State Council issued an executive order in 1950 to assign college graduates for positions throughout the country (《为有计划地合理分配全国公私立高等学校今年暑期毕业生工作的通令》). The executive order required all graduates to conform to the assigned positions according to the nation’s needs regardless personal choices (Zhou, 2006). This order initiated a centrally planned national college graduate-allocation system that lasted until the early 1990s. To the same degree, business enterprises and public institutions, for years, have had no freedom to select or remove their senior staff. They simply had to follow the central system and accept whoever was assigned (Song, 1996).
Stage Two: The Post-Mao Reform
The economic reform has opened doors to foreign-owned and privately-owned enterprises (FOEs/POEs). It has also changed the landscape of managerial and leadership selection since the 1980s. Initially, the change started with the East coastal cities where the reform initiated. The coastal cities attracted an influx of national talents from the restrictive state system to FOEs and POEs.  FOEs followed their headquarters’ practices in talent selection through open competition, interviews and testing. These practices have affected, more or less, the later changes occurred in the centrally controlled national appointment system.
A notable phenomenon has affected the reform during this stage. The government overturned numerous cases in which numerous senior officials had been wrongfully charged for political reasons during the Cultural Revolution.  This reversion was unprecedented in scale and led to a large number of previous cadres resuming their old posts in high ranking governmental positions (Song, 1996). This has resulted in a number of subsequent problems. A large portion of aged officials with an inadequate education background were appointed to the overstaffed governmental departments at all levels. In 1979, 26.7% of senior government officials was 65 years or older  and 23.8% was between 61 to 64 years old. Only 1.6% was under the age of 45. The average age in the Party’s Standing Committee and the senior officials at provincial level was over 61. Only 33% of the officials in the Central Government had received university education, 38% had only junior high school education, and the remainder had little formal education. Additionally, the majority of the members (82.3%) on the Party’s Central Standing Committee and provincial officials did not have a college degree (Song, 1996). In terms of overstaffing, in 1979, the average number of appointees was 10 for each ministry under the State Council, 17 for the Party’s Standing Committees at the provincial level, and 11 for local government.  To the extreme, one province even had 20 deputy governors (Song, 1996).
With the perceived problems in ageing, inadequate educational background, and overstaffing among senior officials, Deng Xiaoping delivered a speech in 1980 noting the need for a reform on the civil official appointment (CODTAC, 2010). Subsequent changes were introduced to the selection process based on new criteria of being revolutionary, young, educated and professionally trained.  Although the central appointment system was still prevailing, political credentials alone were no longer considered the only criterion (CODTAC, 2010).As a result, the number of posts for provincial leaders dropped dramatically with average age reduced from 62 to 55. By 1983, newly appointed officials were mostly young with 71% had a college degree (Song, 1996). To ease the resistance, the Central Government created a new transitioning office, the Central Advisory Commission, to place the veteran officials (Song, 1996).
In 1984, a breakthrough took place in Ningbo, Shenzhen, Guangzhou and Xi’an.  These cities simultaneously devised a similar novel approach to the selection of governmental officials. It was a process of combining recommendations from work units and colleagues and the results of a series of tests and examinations. In 1985, Ningbo developed the system further and called it the Public Selection Process. This system was later generally regarded as a landmark in reforming the senior official selection process in China (Liang and Wei,2010a).
 During the same period in 1986, following a Central Party’s decree entitled “Decisions on  educational system reform,” a new system of “two-way selection” was introduced to college graduate job assignment. This allowed organizations and the graduates more freedom in recruitment and employment (Ge, 2000). Organizations was allowed to bypass the central planning system and talk directly to graduates on campuses, yet the centrally controlled job assignment still played a key role.
Stage Three: Initiating psychological testing
The reform of civil official selection on this stage is coupled with the development of psychological testing. It was not until the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 that psychology was rehabilitated as a discipline. At the same time, the practices in stage two has revealed the importance in developing solid personnel selection and assessment methods (Higgins & Sun, 2002).
The development on stage three is related to the developments in the research arena in the earlier stage. In 1986, Professor Zheng Richang at Beijing Normal University established China’s first assessment centre, and soon published the first book in China on psychological testing in 1987 (Higgins,2005a). Others began to translate and revise classic psychological tests from the West and initiated standardized tests for the selection of civil servants.  The adoption of assessment centres and the associated methods was accompanied by the arrival of FOEs. The development of psychological techniques accelerated in personnel selection since then.
In China, for any initiatives to be viable, they must be reflected in the Party and government’s policy documents.  In 1995 the Central Committee issued two documents, “The interim regulations on selecting officials for the Party and the Government”  and “The announcement on accelerating training and selection of outstanding young officials.” These documents endorsed new principles for selection of public officials: public announcement of openings, open competition, and selection of the best (CODTAC, 2010). In 2000, the Central Committee further issued the following policy documents, “A trial examination outline for open selection of the Party and governmental officials” and “The fundamentals in deepening the reform of civil servant personnel system.” These policies showed the Party’s emphasis on making selection not only public, but also objective and systematic. In 2002, a new clause, “Open selection and competition for posts” was added to the rules regarding the selection process. In 2004, two other important policy documents “Examinations guidelines for open and competitive selection of the party and government officials”  and “Provisional regulations on open selection of Party and governmental officials” were issued. These policies have standardized the contents and procedures for the examination and reinforced selection techniques for quality and competent candidates (CODTAC, 2010). 
The development of personnel testing has faced the following challenges. First, because many tests were translated from English, they suffered problems in cultural specificity and intellectual property issues. This challenge may be addressed as more and more indigenous tests are developed by Chinese researchers. Second, insufficient human resources with adequate training is available as comparatively few psychology graduates in China were prepared in accredited post graduate professional training for organizational psychologists (Higgins & Sun, 2002). 
Current Status
According to Yuan Fang, the President of  Beijing Leadership and Personnel Assessment   Center, senior official selection approaches adopted today is an integrated version that draws from the experience of other nations (Personal communication, November, 2010). They are aimed to test and compare the competencies of candidates while considering detailed aspects of their morality, diligence, achievement, and professional expertise through investigations carried out by their work units (analogous to personal and political references).
Actively developing sound selection methods and approaches can be observed throughout the nation at different levels of governments. In 1996, Xicheng District, Beijing, reported satisfactory results in selecting middle-level civil officials through the above approach combined with psychological assessment (Personal communication, Ma Zheng Yan, November, 2010). In exploring psychological method for public selection of officials, the Municipal Committee of Daqing City created the first test item-bank in 2000. This initiative has now been developed into a national test item-bank (CODTAC), 2010). More recently, Sichuan Province developed an “8+3”approach (Liang & Wei, 2010b).   The “8”refers to eight different types of testing format that candidates must go through, including knowledge tests, leaderless group discussion, case analysis, oral presentations, audio visual communication, answering questions, psychological tests, and a final examination. The “3”represents three additional requirements based on public feedback. First, the candidates must be recommended by the public through an open nomination process; second, a public opinion poll must be conducted and the results be statistically analyzed; third, a comprehensive investigation of the candidate must be carried out by the work unit in a written assessment (Liang & Wei, 2010b).  Nanjing Municipal Party Committee also introduced TV competition speeches into the selection process in 2008.  During the speeches, an audience of 200 people was to score each candidate on site (Liang and Wei, 2010b).  In the same year, Anhui Province Party Committee set up a “public gallery” in the interview room to allow public to monitor the interview process (Liang and Wei, 2010b). 
With the nationwide emphasis on selection methods and procedural transparency, international assessment organizations have joined the Chinese assessment market, including Development Dimensions International (DDI), Personnel Decisions International (PDI), and Saville & Holdsworth Group Limited (SHL) (Personal communication, Professor Zheng Richang, November 2010). With the rapid development of both private and foreign enterprises, increasingly organizations have begun to see the value of contemporary staff selection methods, with less emphasis on individuals’ educational records and more on their aptitudes, abilities and potential.
 Another recent promising change is that local governments have turned public selection into nation-wide search efforts. The candidate pool has been extended to women, non-Party affiliated individuals, and professional experts (Personal communication, Yuan Fang, November, 2010). According to a recent survey in 31 provinces and cities by the CCODTAC (2010), from 2000 to 2006, there were 6697 public selection cases, resulting in 60,465 officials being selected. This accounted for 9.1% of the overall officials appointed during the same period. While a small percentage, this represents a significant progress in competitive selection compared to the past black-box operations. Many well qualified officials have emerged through the selection process and have become a reservoir for future senior appointments (CCOD,2010a). Under a new plan, by 2020, it is expected that 50% of officials in SOEs must be selected through the open and competitive approaches (CCOD, 2010b).
Institutional Support
The development of current selection methods and process has received strong institutional support. As an important organ of power in China, the Central Committee Organization Department (CCOD) has played a critical role in the development of selection process. TheCCOD’s major functions include checking, examining and selecting senior officials for the provincial governments and ministries of the State Council. Other functions also include establishing standards of assessment for senior staff, overseeing a general examination item-bank, providing services to local assessment centres, improving assessment methods through research, evaluation, and development, especially with regard to leaderless group discussions and in-tray tests, promoting and expanding international exchanges and cooperation through training and overseas benchmarking, field investigations, and publications, as well as offering  assessment services to large SOEs(CCODTAC, 2010).
Another recently established supporting institution is the Central Executive Leadership Academy (CELAP) in Pudong, Shanghai, according to Professor Zheng Richang (Personal communication, November, 2010). CELAP parallels to the Central Committee Party School in that it focuses on developing leadership competencies while the Party School emphasizes on political and ideological aspects of the leaders. Currently, CELAP offers training in management psychology to provincial governors, city mayors, university presidents, and CEOs of large SOEs (Xi, 2006).
Furthermore, local governments, from provincial to municipal levels, have established assessment centres responsible for selecting senior officials at corresponding level.   Western style assessment centres now offer their services to SOEs, POEs and FOEs. Some of the largest Chinese companies such as Bank of China and China Mobile Communication Corporation is currently making selection decisions relying on results by the assessment centres. For example, China’s major dairy processing company “Mengniu” has used assessment centres to select its new senior management staff (Song & Gu, 2009). Due to the differences in strategies, organizations emphasize on different aspects of testing. Government selection concentrates on administrative ability, psychological tests, structured interviews, presentations, and competition speeches because of the importance of the candidates’ public credibility. POEs focus more on psychological tests, in-tray tests, leaderless group discussions and semi-structured interviews as they are more interested in financial returns (Personal communication, Professor Zheng Richang, November 2010). Additionally, role play, case analysis, fact searching and administrative games are also used albeit they are still in their early development stage in China (Song & Gu, 2009).   
Procedure of public official selection
To date, most governmental selection and appointment of civil officials follow a five-step process with some variations (Chinese Central Communist Party Office, 2004). We present a generic process at ministerial and provincial level  below.
1. Public announcement: Ministries publically announce the positions through internal and external media. The announcement often specifies the position titles, requirements, and assessment procedures.
2.  Nomination and eligibility review: Both self-nomination and nomination by the organization are accepted in the initial application step. The examiners start reviewing the candidates’ eligibility in terms of age, education background, present position, and job performance.  Some candidates may be rejected at this step.
3. Standardized assessments:  This step consists of two rounds. The candidates first take a written test on general job-related knowledge and case studies. The top 6 to 10 candidates are then interviewed by senior officers and professional assessors in the second round to evaluate their qualities and abilities.  The resulting top three candidates move on to the next step.
4. Scrutiny by the organization:  The organization collects detailed information on candidates’ characters, abilities, work attitudes and performance, sometimes the scrutiny may include personal life aspects.  Conclusion will be drawn after oral and questionnaire feedback from the candidates’ colleagues, resulting in a written recommendation.
5. Final discussion and decision. The higher level officials make a final decision on accepting or rejecting the recommended candidate based on assessment results. Accepted candidates will be announced to the public for a  final round of discussion and feedback.  If there is no significant disagreement from the public within 7 to 15 days of media announcement, the candidate is appointed to the position (CCOD, 2000).
Challenges and future directions
         Overall, China has made a significant progress in public selection and competition for civil official appointments in government organizations focusing on open, fair, impartial and transparent procedures. Yet, it remains with some challenges.
First, different competency models based on solid job analysis have not been developed associated with major positions. This made it difficult to determine what appropriate assessment tool to use for assessing which aspect of a candidate for a given position.  To address this challenge, on the one hand, scholars need to develop competency models for key governmental positions through job and task analysis. On the other hand, it is important to rely on assessment centres and to emphasize MTMM (multitrait-multimethods). In addition to assessment centre techniques, structured interviews, including behavioral interviews and biodata analysis, leaderless discussion groups, in-basket tests, fact-finding tasks and role-play ought to be used more widely for candidate assessment. The ultimate goal for a selection decision is to be based on the talent-position matching principle.
Second, there is a shortage of qualified and experienced professional assessors to implement the improved assessment and selection process.  Applying solid methods and qualitative evaluation techniques is crucial in determining selection validity at all levels. It requires specialized knowledge and expertise, such as conducting unobtrusive observation, recording, classifying and rating competence during assessments, etc. Currently, only limited resources and institutions are available for developing qualified human resources in these area. Policy makers need to consider establishing more training facilities and capacities to develop more professional assessors in this area.
Third, institutionalizing existing proven methods and process of selection is a key to maintaining a sustainable system of civil official selection. With the accumulated experience and knowledge in exploring the appropriate processes at all levels, the selection methods and approaches should be formalized and institutionalized in the governmental human resource management systems and move away from the processed on a trial-and-error basis. In efforts in the future China need to keep with the times, constantly explore new assessment  and scientific  procedures, the pilot  successful in a small area, try a larger range to promote and carry out institutional innovation in order to make stainable and rapid development.
To achieve this, joint effort from experts, decision-makers, officials and citizens is required to identifying the challenges and the solutions.   Scholars and experts in this field should inform the decision-makers about the complexity and diverse nature of selection processes. Empirical research is needed to study the outcome and the impact of those who are appointed through competitive processes and to understand how the new approaches have contributed to improve governmental credibility.
As a result of recent reform in civil official selection, government positions, including jobs in SOEs, have become a popular and preferred option for recent college graduates. For example, in December, 2010, over 1 million college graduates took the annual civil service examination competing for 15,000 government positions. This is equivalent to competing one position among 64 graduates (The Economist, 2010).
As a nation with the oldest history of governmental official selection in the world, China is moving toward a selection process that focuses more on open competition and transparency, and relies more on psychology-based assessment approaches. Given its large administrative territories and wide regional geographical and cultural differences, the process has been challenging with limited progress over the years, sometimes coupled with setbacks.  China’s reform and opening up is a road full of pitfalls and so is the growth of personnel selection techniques.  Effective selection procedures for all senior government and private posts provide the only valid and reliable way for the Chinese to choose qualified officials for the job of leading china forward - as has always been the case in Chinese history.
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Xu, S. T., Wang, D. & Chen, E. W. (2007). Reform of China’s officials’ personnel system for 3 decades. China Talents, 12, 22-24.
Yang,Y. F. (2000), On the open selection of leading officials, (浅议公开选拔领导干部工作,丽水师范专科学校学报),Journal of Lishui Teachers’ College, 4, 17-19.
Yuan.F., (2009). Beijing G＆G Talent  Development Center: The  research and practice of leading talent selection and assessment, Beijing Press. 2009: 1-11 (袁方, 北京双高人才发展中心：领导人才选拔评价研究与实践, 北京出版社, 1-11)
Zhang, H. C. (1988). Psychological measurement in China. International Journal of Psychology, 23, 101-177.
Zhang, P. P. (2005). Historical experiences of the establishment and completion of officials’ selection and assignment system of China’s Communist Party. Journal of History of China’s Communist Party, 10, 24-26.
Zhou, Z. P., Chen, L. X. and Zhao, D. M. (2003).  The inspiration of non-party cadres’ selection derived from historical change and future development trends of cadres’ selection system.   Journal of Socialist College of Hebei Province, 01 ,68-69.
Zhou, Y. (2006). On China’s employment policy and its impact on graduates.  Journal of Hubei Administration Institute, 06, 46-48.
Zhu, Y. F. (1998). A review and discussion of officials’ public selection.  Journal of Party’s Development Research, 02, 31-33.
Further Reading
Aufrecht, L .S. B. (1995).  Reform with Chinese Characteristics: The Context of Chinese Civil Service Reform. Public Administration Review. 55. (2). 175-182
Lan. X. Y. (2004). Study of the reform and improvement of the system of public selection in China. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Central Party School, Beijing.
Hu, Z.Y. ( 2006). An elementary introduction to the creation and developing trends of the model of public selection in China. Science of Leadership,06, 34-35.
Civil Service Law in the People’s Republic of China: A Return to Cadre Personnel Management. Hon S. Chan1,*, Edward Li Suizhou2,* DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00722.x
 Chou, B. J. P.  (2005). Implementing the Reform of Performance:  Appraisal in China’s Civil Service.  China Information . 2005 vol. 19 (1) 39-65
        Chou, B. J. P. (2007). Does “Good Governance” matter? Civil service reform in China. International Journal of Public Administration, 31 (1) 54-75.
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